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INTRODUCTION 
A major military contract is on the line. Your company has seen too 
many recent financial troubles to lose it to the competition. So your 
company opts to slip $38 million under the table to foreign political 
officials to make sure the contract is yours.1 This story is not unusual: an 
estimated 1.5% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) goes to 
paying bribes.2  Giving bribes decreases efficiency in the private sector and 
misallocates government funds to overpriced contracts with the best bribe 
rather than the best project.3 Yet some of the world’s major economies 
have prosecuted as few as three foreign bribery cases since 1999.4 In 1977, 
after recognizing that over $300 million in “questionable payments” went 
from United States firms to foreign officials,5 the U.S. enacted the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).6 For twenty-two years, the United States 
was alone in the push to punish foreign bribery through the FCPA.7 Today, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has created an international body of countries resolved to combat foreign 
bribery practice.8 
 
 1.  This hypothetical scenario follows the foreign bribery scandal of Lockheed Aircraft Corp. in 
1975. See James F. Peltz, Lockheed Agrees to Pay Record Fine: Aerospace: Calabasas Firm Pleads 
Guilty in Connection with Bribing an Egyptian Politician, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 1995), http://articles.la 
times.com/1995-01-28/business/fi-25231_1_egyptian-politician; see also SCANDALS: Lockheed’s 
Defiance: A Right to Bribe?, TIME, Aug. 18 1975, at 71. 
 2.  Michael Paul Gieger, 220 Years Later and the Commonwealth is Still Imposing Laws on the 
United States: A Comparative Look at U.S. Antibribery Legislation and the United Kingdom’s Bribery 
Act 2010, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1383 (2013). 
 3.  See Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 85–86 (2007). 
 4.  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 31 (2014) [hereinafter OECD FOREIGN 
BRIBERY REPORT]. 
 5.  Krever, supra note 3, at 87 (citing William L. Larson, Effective Enforcement of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 561, 561 n.1 (1980); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS 
AND PRACTICES (1976); Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Within the American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L. 509, 518 (1997)). 
 6.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2012). 
 7.  The FCPA was passed in 1977 and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions entered into force in 1999. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 
78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2012)); OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention, OECD, 
http:// www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/oecdanti-briberyconventionentryintoforceoftheconvention.htm 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 8.  Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, art. 12, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 4 [hereinafter OECD Convention]. 
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But nearly two decades after the OECD resolved to combat bribery on 
an international scale, the variation in foreign bribery prosecution by 
member states remains dramatic. Where the U.S. has prosecuted 128 
foreign bribery schemes since the OECD began targeting bribery, the next 
highest is Germany with only twenty-six.9 France and Japan have 
prosecuted only five and three cases, respectively.10 At the same time, the 
U.S. has grown more aggressive in prosecuting bribery beyond its borders. 
The U.S. has targeted foreign corporations offering bribes in foreign 
countries with only tangential U.S. ties. In fact, of the ten FCPA cases 
resulting in the highest fines, eight were not brought against U.S. 
companies.11 It seems that the U.S. remains unsatisfied with its OECD co-
parties in the realm of bribery. And as the country that first pushed for an 
international effort to combat bribery, its dissatisfaction supports the 
conclusion that the anti-bribery regimes of its fellow signatories are 
lacking. The international prosecution statistics and U.S. extraterritorial 
prosecutions underline the problem this Note seeks to address: why do we 
continue to see such variation in foreign bribery prosecution even among 
countries that have agreed to combat it? 
This Note seeks to expose some possible explanations for the 
international variation in bribery prosecution. Today, the main vehicle for 
international cooperation in combating bribery remains the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions. This Note does not analyze the 
consequences of the fact that some countries have declined to punish 
foreign bribery. Instead, it focuses on the problem of countries that have 
failed to follow through on promised enforcement. The Note uses a case 
study to examine the variation in enforcement among OECD Convention 
signatories and to reveal how countries that supposedly have the same 
enforcement requirements can, nonetheless, reach dramatically different 
results. 
Some analysis in this Note concerns FCPA prosecution abroad. Either 
internal or external actors can curb foreign bribery in a country. The 
country can prosecute cases of bribery itself, or it can facilitate cross-
border investigations by other countries. The FCPA is a prominent example 
of the latter. The U.S. is not the only country that pursues extraterritorial 
foreign bribery prosecution. For example, the United Kingdom Bribery Act 
 
 9.  OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT, supra note 4, at 31. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See Richard L. Cassin, With Alstom, Three French Companies Are Now in the FCPA Top 
Ten, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 23, 2014, 9:45 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/12/23/with-alstom-
three-french-companies-are-now-in-the-fcpa-top-t.html. 
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of 2010 “expanded liability for acts committed outside of the [U.K.] to 
individuals who are not U.K. nationals.”12 But the FCPA provides more 
cases for analysis due to its longer history. Therefore, this Note analyzes 
how OECD Convention signatories have reacted to FCPA prosecutions in 
their territories as a measure of compliance with the international push to 
punish bribery. If we take the FCPA as a standard of aggressive foreign 
bribery prosecution, a state’s support or resistance to FCPA enforcement 
within its borders can provide another way to measure the variation in anti-
bribery regimes across countries. 
This Note begins with a brief history of the FCPA and the OECD 
Convention in Part I. The history provides a background for understanding 
where foreign bribery prosecution started. Part II scrutinizes anti-bribery 
regimes today using a case study of three OECD Convention countries with 
differing rates of prosecution: Germany, France, and Japan. Part III begins 
by outlining how these same countries reacted to international 
environmental agreements. Comparing compliance with environmental 
protections to compliance with anti-bribery regimes, demonstrates that 
something about corruption in particular, rather than a general disdain for 
international interference, is causing this prosecution variation. Lastly, Part 
III analyzes foreign corruption prosecutions in Germany, France, and Japan 
to identify the factors causing compliance and cooperation variations. 
Ultimately, it appears that economic, cultural, and political pressures all 
influence a country’s willingness to prosecute foreign bribery. More 
specifically, internal pressure from corporations, the citizenry’s view of 
bribery, and personal political motivations all affect how Germany, France, 
and Japan have approached foreign bribery. Even where a country has 
agreed to combat foreign bribery, these factors can play important roles in 
shaping a country’s willingness to enforce those laws. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY: SHIFTING FOREIGN BRIBERY 
PROSECUTIONS ON TO THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE 
A.  The U.S. Response to Foreign Bribery 
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) found over $300 million in “questionable 
payments” made by U.S. firms to foreign officials.13 In December 1977, 
 
 12.  Gieger, supra note 2, at 1405. 
 13.  Krever, supra note 3, at 87 (citing William L. Larson, Effective Enforcement of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 561, 561 n.1 (1980); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS 
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Congress responded by enacting the FCPA: “the first legislation in the 
world to recognize and seek to curb the contribution of domestically based 
corporations to foreign corruption.”14 
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provision makes it a crime to bribe foreign 
officials.15 Under the FCPA, foreign bribery is generally the act of offering 
a foreign official payment in exchange for a business advantage.16 The anti-
bribery provision covers three types of actors: issuers,17 domestic 
concerns,18 and any person who violates the provision while corruptly 
using U.S. instrumentalities in U.S. territory.19 
The coverage of multiple actors has given the U.S. a flexible tool for 
prosecuting foreign actors for bribery. For example, foreign corporations 
can be issuers for FCPA purposes. Foreign shares can be traded in U.S. 
markets as American Depository Receipts (ADR).20 Therefore, the issuing 
foreign corporation becomes an issuer subject to the FCPA.21 Absent 
ADRs, U.S. prosecutors can look for acts that occurred “while in the 
territory of the United States” that violate the FCPA.22 And as evidenced by 
 
AND PRACTICES (1976); Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Within the American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L. 509, 518 (1997)). 
 14.  Id. at 84. 
 15.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012). The entire FCPA is part of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–pp 
(2012). 
 16.  The anti-bribery provision is a criminal statute. It prohibits the actor from corruptly using “the 
mails or any means of instrumentality of interstate commerce” to further an “offer, payment, promise to 
pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of 
the giving of anything of value” to a foreign official or political party to improperly influence that 
recipient’s actions. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012). All three 
subsections use the same language. The text qualifies acts as improper when done “in order to assist . . . 
in obtaining or retaining business.” Id. 
 17.  Id. § 78dd-1. The covered issuers are those with a class of securities registered under § 78l, or 
which are “required to file reports” under § 78o(d). Id. Additionally, § 78dd-1 regulates “any officer, 
director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer.” 
Id. 
 18.  Id. § 78dd-2. A domestic concern for purposes of § 78dd is “any individual who is a citizen, 
national, or resident of the United States,” and any corporation or business organization “which has its 
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws” of a State, 
territory, possession, or commonwealth therein. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1). 
 19.  Id. § 78dd-3. 
 20.  See Mauro M Wolfe, Does the US Government Have Limitless Jurisdiction Enforcing the 
FCPA?, NEWSL. CRIM. L. SEC. LEGAL PRAC. DIVISION INT’L B. ASS’N (Int’l B. Ass’n, London, U.K.), 
May 2010, http://www.martindale.com/members/Article_Atachment.aspx?od=299343&id=1055878& 
filename=asr-1055918.pdf (citing Complaint ¶ 7, SEC v. Fiat S.p.A., No. 08-cv-02211 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 
2008) (“Throughout the relevant period, Fiat’s American Depositary Receipts were registered pursuant 
to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol 
‘FIA.’”)). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2012). 
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recent FCPA cases against foreign corporations, a violation can occur in 
the U.S. simply by routing the funds through a U.S. bank.23 Overall, the 
language of the FCPA gives the U.S. broad jurisdiction over actors inside 
and outside the United States. 
While Congress initially passed the FCPA in response to U.S.-based 
bribery, concern transitioned to ensuring that bribery did not disadvantage 
U.S. companies abroad. After 1977, U.S. firms were bound by the FCPA, 
but foreign firms were not.24 A poll administered two years after enactment 
showed that “71% of respondent executives of multinational companies 
thought U.S. companies would lose business to foreign competitors as a 
direct result of the [FCPA].”25 The “uneven playing field” resulted in a loss 
of approximately $30 billion per year in international business for the U.S. 
to companies outside of FCPA regulation.26  Given these concerning 
figures, the U.S. needed to ensure that foreign bribery was punished to 
eliminate the handicap on U.S. businesses abroad. In addition to permissive 
FCPA jurisdiction allowing prosecutors to target foreign actors, the U.S. 
began pushing for a more international response to foreign bribery by 
pressuring the OECD to take up the issue. 
B.  The OECD Convention: The International Answer to Foreign Bribery 
1. The Text of the OECD Convention 
The first major step toward a united, international front against bribery 
was the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (the Convention). After 
several years of urging by the U.S., the OECD Council approved the 
Recommendation on Bribery in International Business Transactions.27 In 
1997, thirty-three countries signed the Convention.28 Today, the OECD 
Convention boasts forty-one signatories29 and remains the main vehicle for 
 
 23.  See infra Part II.B–D. 
 24.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3. Sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-2 were enacted in 1977, though § 
78dd-3 was not enacted until 1998. 
 25.  Krever, supra note 3, at 90. 
 26.  Presidential Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 
1998, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2290 (Nov. 10, 1998), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
fcpa/docs/signing.pdf; see also Krever, supra note 3, at 90 (noting that the CIA estimated that the “U.S. 
lost $36 billion in international business to bribe-paying international competitors” from 1994 to 1995). 
 27.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 10 (1998). 
 28.  Id. at 11. 
 29.  The signatories include the 34 OECD member countries plus Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Colombia, Latvia, Russia, and South Africa. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014, OECD 
(May 21, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf. 
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international cooperation in anti-bribery enforcement.30 But even among 
signatories, there is notable variation in anti-bribery enforcement. 
The Convention’s proactive bribery prosecution requirements explain 
the confusion over why anti-bribery enforcement remains so erratic outside 
of the U.S. The Convention imposes positive requirements on its parties 
and creates a regime that caters to cross-border prosecution. It recognizes 
that “bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business 
transactions,” and that “all countries share a responsibility to combat 
bribery.”31 The language declares that Convention signatories shall 
criminalize bribery.32 Furthermore, parties are to provide legal assistance to 
any investigations or proceedings under the Convention.33 And the parties 
are to cooperate in follow-up monitoring and implementation as overseen 
by the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business 
Transactions.34 The Convention imposes a duty to punish bribery, requires 
aid to other states doing so, and creates an accountability system. 
Therefore, it ensures the ability to flush out bribery regardless of national 
boundaries. 
The Convention also has permissive jurisdiction language in line with 
extraterritorial prosecution. Article 4 instructs parties to establish 
jurisdiction over “the bribery of foreign officials when the offence is 
committed in whole or in part in its territory,” or by its nationals abroad.35 
The commentaries add that “[t]he territorial basis for jurisdiction should be 
interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery 
act is not required.”36 Therefore, compliance with international anti-bribery 
expectations for a country means not only punishing foreign bribery itself, 
but also aiding extraterritorial investigations by other countries. 
 
 30.  While several regional and nongovernmental organizations have begun addressing 
international bribery, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption is the only other truly 
international anti-bribery effort. See Gieger, supra note 2, at 1387 (identifying the OECD Convention, 
the 2003 UN Convention, and then only regional and nongovernmental organizations); see also Lauren 
Ann Ross, Using Foreign Relations Law to Limit Extraterritorial Application of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 62 DUKE L.J. 445, 468–69 (2012) (“Thus, because all of the 1998 changes incorporate 
treaty provisions, the FCPA as currently written must be considered in light of the OECD Convention 
according to norms for implementing legislation.”). 
 31.  OECD Convention, supra note 8, at preamble. 
 32.  Id. art. 1. If nations lack a corporate criminal liability statute in their legal regime, they are to 
“provide for non-criminal sanctions, such as fines.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 11; OECD Convention, 
supra note 8, art. 3(2). 
 33.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 11; OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 9. 
 34.  OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 12. 
 35.  Id. art. 4. 
 36.  Id. at 16, cmt. 25. 
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2. From 1999 to Today 
 The OECD Convention has successfully increased foreign bribery 
prosecution internationally. Seventeen countries have had successful anti-
bribery cases since signing the OECD Convention.37 These governments 
have investigated 263 individuals and 164 entities for a total of 427 foreign 
bribery cases.38 And the number of cases concluded per year has increased 
dramatically since 1999. In 2003, there were still fewer than ten cases a 
year, but by 2011 the rate had increased to nearly eighty.39 Overall, the 
OECD Convention seems to have prompted governments to prosecute 
bribery. 
However, while these general numbers are promising, they obscure 
underlying variations in enforcement. U.S. anti-bribery efforts continue to 
dwarf those of the rest of the world.40 Of the thirty-nine OECD member 
countries, the U.S. has prosecuted the most corruption schemes since the 
Convention with 128 cases, over one-fourth of the total prosecutions.41 
Germany is the next highest and has prosecuted only twenty-six to date.42 It 
is not as though the U.S. accounts for one-fourth of the world’s corruption 
schemes, and the other States simply have fewer crimes to prosecute. Of 
the ten FCPA cases resulting in the highest fines, eight have been against 
foreign firms.43 Bribery is occurring in countries aside from the U.S., but 
the U.S. is just the one prosecuting it. Thus, despite the admirable strides 
made by OECD Convention signatories in addressing and prosecuting 
foreign bribery, there is still something causing the U.S. to pick up the 
slack left by the continued disparity. 
II. ANTI-BRIBERY PROSECUTION TODAY: A CASE STUDY 
This Part uses case studies of Germany, France, and Japan to examine 
the variation in anti-bribery prosecution today. All three were party to the 
OECD Convention and participated in its drafting.44 At the time of the 
 
 37.  OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. Data was collected from February 15, 
1999 to June 1, 2014. Id. 
 38.  Id. at 8. 
 39.  Id. at 13, fig. 1. 
 40.  Gieger, supra note 2, at 1387. 
 41.  OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT, supra note 4, at 31, fig. 19. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Cassin, supra note 11. 
 44.  See Press Packet, Fr., Nat’l & Int’l Approaches to Improving Integrity and Transparency in 
Gov’t, at 1 (July 1998), http://www.oecd.org/france/2090381.pdf (discussing French and German 
efforts to form a binding agreement during the Convention, and recognizing that the convention was 
prepared by all twenty-nine Member countries and five non-Members); see also History, OECD, 
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OECD Convention, the U.S., Germany, Japan, and France were the largest 
OECD exporters.45 In 2014, all four countries were still in the top five.46 A 
larger export market exposes corporations to more chances or demands for 
foreign bribery. Thus, these countries have had the most opportunities and 
incentives among the OECD Convention parties to be proactive about 
bribery prosecution. Furthermore, of the top ten FCPA actions, German 
firms appear twice, French firms appear three times, and Japanese firms 
appears once.47 Regardless of the country’s prosecution, there are actors in 
these countries bribing foreign officials. And these cases provide an 
opportunity to examine how these countries react to extraterritorial 
prosecution of foreign bribery in their jurisdiction. Overall, this Part reveals 
three distinct variations in anti-bribery enforcement within the OECD 
Convention countries: Germany, with a strong anti-bribery regime and a 
friendly approach to FCPA prosecution; France, which resists prosecution 
of its nationals in either regard; and Japan, which is lagging in its own 
enforcement but is open to U.S. intervention. 
A. Germany 
1. Germany’s Response to Foreign Bribery 
After the U.S., Germany has taken the strongest stance against foreign 
bribery. The American Bar Association noted that “Germany has assumed 
a leading position in the investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery 
cases.”48 Germany has had twenty-six sanctions for foreign bribery 
schemes since the OECD entry into force, more than any nation aside from 
the U.S.49 In its 2013 follow-up report, the OECD Working Group praised 
 
http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (noting that Japan joined the OECD in 
1964). 
 45.  OECD Convention, supra note 8, at 13. In 1998 the U.S. accounted for 15.9% of OECD 
exports, Germany 14.1%, Japan 11.8%, and France 7.7%. Id. 
 46.  International Trade (MEI), OECD.STATEXTRACTS, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSet 
Code=MEI_TRD# (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). Since 2008, the Netherlands has surpassed France as the 
fourth largest OECD exporter. Id. In 2014, the top five OECD export countries were the U.S. with 
15.0%, Germany 13.8%, Japan 6.8%, the Netherlands 6.4%, and France at 5.5%. Id. 
 47.  Cassin, supra note 11. The other represented nations are the Netherlands and Italy in a joint 
action against Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. and its parent company ENI S.p.A. Id.; Litigation 
Release No. 21588, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 7, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ 
2010/ lr21588.htm. 
 48.  T. Markus Funk & Jess A. Dance, Global Litigator: Germany’s Increasingly Robust 
Anticorruption Efforts, 38 LITIG. 3, 1 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigation_ 
journal/2011_12/spring/global_litigator_potential_collateral_estoppel_effect.html (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 49.  OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT, supra note 4, at 31. The U.S. has had 128 sanctions since 
the OECD Convention entered into force, and after Germany, Korea has had 11. Id. 
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Germany for its “robust enforcement efforts.”50 And Transparency 
International51 has ranked Germany as an active enforcer (the same 
category as the U.S.) out of active, moderate, limited, or little or no 
enforcement.52 Recommendations by both of these groups focus on the lack 
of corporate criminal liability for foreign bribery,53 and urge higher 
sanctions against individuals.54 
Germany has embraced foreign influences on its legal regime for 
bribery. For example, “[w]ithin the last decade, the compliance movement 
from the [U.S.] has greatly influenced the economic crime debate [in 
Germany].”55 Compliance is a key tool for U.S. prosecutors.56 But recently 
the importance and usefulness of compliance has become clearer in 
Germany.57 Now compliance investigations are “commonplace.”58 This has 
caused some German companies to withdraw from foreign countries with 
high corruption risks.59 It seems both German corporations and the German 
government have embraced anti-bribery enforcement. 
2. Germany and the FCPA 
In 2008, the German company Siemens A.G. agreed to pay $350 
million to the SEC, and $450 million to the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) in the biggest FCPA settlement to date.60 The U.S. government 
 
 50.  Germany: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, at 3 (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/GermanyPhase3WrittenFollowUpEN.pdf. 
 51.  Transparency International is an independent organization dedicated to investigating and 
combating corruption around the world. Overview, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.trans 
parency.org/whoweare/organisation (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 52.  Exporting Corruption: Germany, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/ 
exporting_corruption/Germany (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 53.  Germany: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, supra note 50, at 8–9; 
Exporting Corruption: Germany, supra note 52. 
 54.  Exporting Corruption: Germany, supra note 52. 
 55.  Marc Engelhart, Development and Status of Economic Criminal Law in Germany, 15 
GERMAN L.J. 693, 698 (2014). 
 56.  See id. at 716 (“The development originated in the USA where compliance is of key 
importance in mitigating a sentence for companies according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.”). 
 57.  Id. at 713 (“Beginning with the Siemens case in 2007, compliance investigations have 
become commonplace.”); see also Karl Sidhu, Anti-Corruption Compliance Standards in the Aftermath 
of the Siemens Scandal, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1343, 1350–51 (2009) (describing the growing continuity 
between U.S. and German compliance standards). 
 58.  Engelhart, supra note 55, at 713. 
 59.  European Commission, Annex 5 (Germany) to the EU Anti-Corruption Report, at 8, COM 
(2014) 38 final (Feb. 3, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-
crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-
report/docs/2014_acr_germany_chapter_en.pdf. 
 60.  SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 
15. 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm; Cassin, supra note 11; Siemens AG and 
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found that Siemens had violated the FCPA through a “systematic practice 
of paying bribes to foreign government officials to obtain business.”61 The 
alleged bribes went from the German company to countries including 
Venezuela, Israel, Mexico, and Iraq, but not any officials in the U.S.62 The 
jurisdictional hook came from Siemens issuing securities in the U.S., and 
from the use of U.S. banks in a number of the bribery transactions.63 As 
one practitioner noted, “What these charges foreshadow is that virtually 
any transaction anywhere in the world, no matter how tangentially (if at all) 
it touches the U.S., can give rise to allegations of FCPA violations.”64 And 
indeed, Siemens was not the end of FCPA enforcement in Germany; 
Daimler AG in 2010, Deutsche Telekom AG in 2011, and Allianz SE in 
2012 all paid multi-million dollar settlements for FCPA violations.65 
But in Germany these FCPA enforcement actions have not been the 
product of unilateral American action. Siemens paid an additional 
estimated $569 million to the German government, which conducted its 
own investigation through the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office.66 The 
U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia announced: “The coordinated 
efforts of U.S. and German law enforcement authorities in this case set the 
standard for multi-national cooperation in the fight against corrupt business 
practices.”67 The DOJ noted that the collaboration with the Munich Public 
Prosecutor’s Office was made possible by the OECD Convention legal 
assistance provisions.68 Thus, the available evidence indicates that 
Germany has a positive, working relationship with the FCPA as a parallel 
to its own corruption proceedings. 
 
Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 
Million in Combined Criminal Fines, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/ 
archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html [hereinafter Siemens Pleads Guilty to FCPA 
Violations]. 
 61.  SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery, supra note 60. 
 62.  Id.; Siemens Pleads Guilty to FCPA Violations, supra note 60. 
 63.  Audrey Kravets, Introduction to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Germany, 38 
DAJV NEWSL. 32, 33 (2013); Siemens Pleads Guilty to FCPA Violations, supra note 60. 
 64.  Claudius O. Sokenu & Tiffany A. Archer, Alarming Lessons From Siemens, 28 INT’L  FIN. L. 
REV. 42, 42 (2009). 
 65.  Kravets, supra note 63, at 34. The Daimler settlement ranks tenth in the top ten FCPA 
enforcement cases with a $185 million payment. Cassin, supra note 11. 
 66.  See Siemens Pleads Guilty to FCPA Violations, supra note 60 (stating that Siemens paid 
approximately $569 million in corporate fines and disgorgement of profits to dispose of the Munich 
Public Prosecutor’s investigation); Sokenu & Archer, supra note 64 (stating that Siemens paid an 
additional $528 million to Germany); Sidhu, supra note 57, at 1344–45 (stating that Siemens paid €596 
million to German authorities). 
 67.  Siemens Pleads Guilty to FCPA Violations, supra note 60. 
 68.  Id. 
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B.  France 
1. France’s Response to Foreign Bribery 
France has yet to convict a French company for foreign bribery.69 As 
evidenced by three FCPA proceedings, however, that is not to say French 
companies are not bribing foreign officials.70 While France has prosecuted 
five foreign bribery schemes since the OECD Convention, no prosecution 
has resulted in the conviction of a French company.71 And while France has 
opened twenty-four new foreign corruption procedures since 2012,72 the 
prosecution rate given the size of its economy is still low.73 Only three 
individuals have been prosecuted as a result of those proceedings.74 In 
contrast to Germany, the Working Group “considers that France is 
insufficiently in compliance with the Anti-Bribery Convention. . . .”75 
The Working Group also found that French prosecutors lack 
proactivity in seeking convictions.76 This inactivity can be attributed to a 
lack of prosecutorial independence.77 The Working Group is concerned that 
prosecutors cannot conduct their cases free of influence from those holding 
political power.78 France has sought to curb this political influence by 
eliminating the practice of having the Minister of Justice issue individual 
instruction to prosecutors.79 But a contemplated reform that would allow 
 
 69.  Statement of the OECD Working Group on Bribery on France’s Implementation of the Anti-
Bribery Convention, OECD (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/statement-of-the-oecd-
working-group-on-bribery-on-france-s-implementation-of-the-anti-bribery-convention.htm. 
 70.  See id. (noting that French companies have been convicted abroad for foreign bribery). 
 71.  See OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT, supra note 4, at 31, fig. 19 (showing that France has 
sanctioned five foreign bribery schemes since the OECD Convention, but noting that the sanctions need 
not have been against companies headquartered in the listed country); Statement of the OECD Working 
Group on Bribery on France’s Implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 69 (stating 
that France has yet to convict a French company of foreign bribery); see also France: Follow-Up to the 
Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, at 4 (Dec. 2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/France-
Phase-3-Written-Follow-up-ENG.pdf (noting that no legal person has been convicted for foreign 
bribery in France, though a number of individuals have been convicted). 
 72.  Statement of the OECD Working Group on Bribery on France’s implementation of the Anti-
Bribery Convention, supra note 69. 
 73.  European Commission, Annex 10 (France) to the EU Anti-Corruption Report, at 7, COM 
(2014) 38 final (Feb. 3, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-
crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_france_chapter_en.pdf. 
 74.  France: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, supra note 71, at 4. 
 75.  Statement of the OECD Working Group on Bribery on France’s Implementation of the Anti-
Bribery Convention, supra note 69. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  See France: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, supra note 71, at 5 
(finding a lack of prosecutorial independence from political power). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
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prosecutors to operate free of political oversight has not yet materialized; 
accordingly, the Working Group’s concern has not abated.80 Additionally, 
Transparency International dubbed France a limited enforcement country, 
citing, among other things, the same concern with prosecutorial 
independence.81 
Statutory issues also hamper foreign bribery prosecution in France. 
France has a dual criminality requirement for foreign bribery; the act must 
be an offense in both countries involved in the bribe.82 Additionally, France 
will only assert jurisdiction if the offender or victim is a French national.83 
And corporations can get around criminal liability by dealing through 
intermediaries that are not French nationals.84 Overall, a prosecutor faces 
many challenges from legal and political pressures when pursuing a foreign 
bribery case in France. And as long as these limits exist, it is unlikely that 
France will achieve the level of foreign bribery enforcement seen in 
Germany. 
2. France and the FCPA 
Of the top ten FCPA cases, three were brought against French 
companies, more than any other represented nation.85 The 2014 settlement 
with Alstom S.A. is the second largest in FCPA history at $772 million.86 
Total S.A. at $398 million and Technip S.A. at $338 million also make the 
top ten.87 Alstom plead guilty to the FCPA violations as an issuer of 
securities in U.S. markets.88 As with Siemens, none of the bribery took 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Exporting Corruption: France, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/ 
exporting_corruption/France (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 82.  Annex 10 (France) to the EU Anti-Corruption Report, supra note 73, at 7. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 7–8. 
 85.  Cassin, supra note 11. 
 86.  Id.; Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve 
Foreign Bribery Charges: Largest-Ever Foreign Bribery Resolution Within the Department of Justice, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-
772-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery [hereinafter Alstom Pleads Guilty]. 
 87.  Cassin, supra note 11; French Oil and Gas Company, Total, S.A., Charged in the United 
States and France in Connection With an International Bribery Scheme, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 29, 
2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/french-oil-and-gas-company-total-sa-charged-united-states-and-
france-connection-international; Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and 
Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 28, 2010), http:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/technip-sa-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-
240-million. 
 88.  Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Alstom S.A., No. 14-CR-246 (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2014). 
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place in the U.S.89 But Alstom was charged as an issuer of securities in the 
U.S.90 The DOJ settled similar charges against Total S.A. in 2013 as an 
issuer on the New York Stock Exchange.91 The French company had been 
using bribes in Iran to obtain oil concessions.92 During the Total case, the 
U.S. worked with French law enforcement in the “first coordinated action” 
for foreign bribery between the two countries.93 The Acting Assistant 
Attorney General for the U.S. added that the “two countries are working 
more closely today than ever before to combat corporate corruption.”94 And 
France referred Total, its Chairman, its Chief Executive Officer, and other 
individuals to the Criminal Courts.95 
However, France’s relationship with extraterritorial prosecution 
continues to face strains not seen in Germany. The DOJ settled with Total 
in 2013, and in November 2014 Parisian magistrates were just concluding 
that Total should be put on trial.96 It remains to be seen if French courts 
will actually convict their oil giant. Additionally, despite “working more 
closely . . . than ever,” France continues to change what are traditionally 
“boilerplate obligations to cooperate” post-settlement with U.S. 
prosecutors.97 The changes reveal some of the major challenges FCPA 
enforcement in France faces, including French data protection, and labor 
and blocking statutes.98 Data protection has proved especially problematic 
for FCPA enforcement. The Commission nationale de l’informatique et des 
libertes (CNIL) must authorize all “personal data” transfers to the U.S.99 
 
 89.  See generally id. (discussing bribes in Saudi Arabia, the Bahamas, Taiwan, Egypt, and 
Indonesia but not the U.S.). 
 90.  Id. at B-1 to B-2. Alstom was charged with a books and records violation and failure to 
implement a system of sufficient internal controls. Id. at B-2. 
 91.  French Oil and Gas Company, Total, S.A., Charged in the United States and France in 
Connection With an International Bribery Scheme, supra note 87. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Inti Landauro, France to Prosecute Total SA Over Iranian Contracts in the 1990s, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/france-to-prosecute-total-sa-over-iranian-contracts-in-
the-1990s-1416940041. 
 97.  GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2013 MID-YEAR FCPA UPDATE 5 (2013), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Mid-Year-FCPA-Update.pdf. 
 98.  See id. (“But the DPA itself reveals some of the challenges of French-U.S. law enforcement 
coordination, qualifying what is usually a boilerplate obligation to cooperate with U.S. authorities post-
settlement with notations that any such cooperation must be consistent with French data protection, 
labor, and blocking statutes.”). 
 99.  Paul Berger et al., Conducting Third Party FCPA Diligence in France, GLOBAL LEGAL POST 
(Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.globallegalpost.com/global-view/conducting-third-party-fcpa-diligence-in-
france-87881254/. 
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This includes information on an individual’s affiliations, government 
affiliations, and criminal records,100 which the U.S. may want in 
establishing bribery relationships during FCPA enforcement. Data 
protection also makes it difficult for companies to comply with FCPA due 
diligence requirements.101 The French Data Protection Act applies to all 
activity in a French territory.102 If a company is trying to investigate 
potential business partners in France, they may be unable to obtain 
necessary information about the individual to ensure they are not involved 
in corrupt payments.103 
Moreover, in December 2014 the Working Group assessed: “With 
regard to mutual legal assistance, no measure has been taken to ensure that 
the granting of such assistance in foreign bribery cases not be influenced by 
considerations of national economic interest under the guise of protecting 
‘the fundamental interests of the nation.’”104 Thus, while the Total S.A. 
case marked a promising step toward future cooperation, that openness 
does not seem to have continued. In the Alstom case a year later, the DOJ 
thanked the law enforcement departments in Indonesia, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, and 
Taiwan, but did not mention any coordination with France.105 And it does 
not appear that France has started any of its own enforcement proceedings 
against Alstom yet.106 Overall, France’s open cooperation with FCPA 
enforcement seems short-lived. And the country’s general unwillingness to 
convict its own firms of foreign bribery offers little promise for change in 
the near future. 
C.  Japan 
1.  Japan’s Response to Foreign Bribery 
Japan is facing heavy criticism from the OECD for its insufficient 
anti-bribery regime and enforcement. In 2005, the Working Group was “so 
critical of Japan that [it] ordered that Japan undergo a second review.”107 
 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  France: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, supra note 71, at 6. 
 105.  Alstom Pleads Guilty, supra note 86. 
 106.  The author was unable to find any sources referencing a French action against Alstom 
resulting from the bribery scheme discovered by the U.S. 
 107.  Charles Duross & James E. Hough, Japan Discloses New Efforts to Combat Foreign Bribery, 
as OECD Steps Up Pressure on Japan to Increase Enforcement, MONDAQ (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/314688/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/SEC+Staff+Guidance+On+The+Use+
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By 2011, in the wake of an FCPA case, Japan had increased the importance 
of enforcement and sent officials to attend foreign bribery training in the 
U.S.108 But the OECD still considers Japan’s foreign corruption approach 
lacking.109 Japan has the third largest economy in the world and robust 
import and export businesses.110 But it has only prosecuted four corruption 
schemes since the OECD Convention,111 even though the Japanese media 
has reported on several allegations of corruption in Japanese companies.112 
Transparency International ranked Japan as a “little or no enforcement” 
country, the lowest category possible.113 
The Working Group raised a number of specific concerns about 
Japan’s approach to foreign corruption. Firstly, there is a “lack of targeted 
resources for the purpose of detecting, investigating and prosecuting 
foreign bribery cases.”114 In other words, Japan has no clear organization 
for preventing, investigating, or prosecuting foreign bribery.115 Secondly, 
the organization that seems to have the most control, the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) has not clarified what comprises a 
facilitation payment versus a bribe, and to what extent the former is 
legal.116 Lastly, Japan has not ensured that tax inspectors are equipped to 
identify “miscellaneous” tax return expenses that are actually suspicious 
payments.117 Where France faces challenges in its regime in converting 
investigations to convictions, Japan seems to face challenges in identifying 
possible corruption schemes to begin with. 
 
Of+Social+Media+In+Securities+Offerings+Tender+Offers+Business+Combinations+And+Proxy+Co
ntests. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Statement of OECD on Japan’s Efforts to Increase Foreign Bribery Enforcement, OECD 
(June 12, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/corruption/statement-of-oecd-on-japan-efforts-to-increase-
foreign-bribery-enforcement.htm. 
 110.  Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Japan, OECD 8 
(Dec. 2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Japanphase3reportEN.pdf. 
 111.  OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT, supra note 4, at 31; Bruch Einhorn & Isabel Reynolds, 
Japan is Pressed to Step Up Foreign Bribery Prosecutions, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2014), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-10-30/japan-is-pressed-to-step-up-foreign-bribery-prosecutions. 
 112.  Japan: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, at 4 (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/JapanP3WrittenFollowUpReportEN.pdf. 
 113.  Exporting Corruption: Japan, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/ 
exporting_ corruption/Japan (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 114.  Japan: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, supra note 112, at 4. 
 115.  Id. at 5. 
 116.  Id. at 4. 
 117.  Id. 
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2.  Japan and the FCPA. 
Japan makes its appearance on the FCPA top ten enforcements list 
with the JGC Corporation case from 2011.118 JGC Corporation paid $218.8 
million in exchange for a deferred prosecution agreement.119 The DOJ 
charged JGC for authorizing a joint venture to hire agents that would pay 
bribes to Nigerian government officials in order to obtain contracts.120 
Although JGC was not an issuer,121 the U.S. established jurisdiction 
through a vicarious liability theory through an American joint-venture 
partner,122and by citing wire transfers through New York banks that created 
a territorial act in furtherance of the bribery.123 In fact, all FCPA actions in 
Japan have been against companies that are not issuers in the U.S.124 
It is not clear whether Japan has provided official support to U.S. 
prosecutors during these FCPA enforcement cases. In the JGC case, the 
U.S. cited significant assistance from France, Italy, Switzerland, and the 
U.K., but made no mention of Japan.125 However, Japan and the U.S. do 
have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).126 An MLAT “enable[s] 
law enforcement authorities to obtain evidence and other procedural 
measures abroad in a form that is admissible in the courts of the requesting 
country and to provide assistance to their counterparts in such a form.”127 
France and the U.S. also have an MLAT,128 which shows that such an 
 
 118.  JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a 
$218.8 Million Criminal Penalty, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jgc-
corporation-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-2188 [hereinafter JGC 
Corp. Resolves FCPA Investigation]; Cassin, supra note 11. 
 119.  JGC Corp. Resolves FCPA Investigation, supra note 118. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. JGC Corporation, No. 4:11-cr-
00260 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011) (recognizing Technip S.A. was an issuer under the 1934 Act, but not 
alleging the same for JGC). 
 122.  For a more in-depth discussion of the JGC vicarious liability theory of jurisdiction, see 
generally Ross, supra note 30. 
 123.  Ross, supra note 30, at 447; see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, 
Attachment A at 16–17 (“[E]mployees, agents, and co-conspirators of JGC willfully aided, abetted, 
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, and caused the commission of FCPA violations by . . . 
aiding and abetting KBR in causing wire transfers of $39.8 million . . . via a correspondent bank 
account in New York, New York.”). 
 124.  Duross & Hough, supra note 107, at 5. 
 125.  See JGC Corp. Resolves FCPA Investigation, supra note 118 (“Significant assistance was 
provided by the SEC’s Division of Enforcement and by authorities in France, Italy, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom.”). 
 126.  Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Japan, supra note 
110, at 51. 
 127.  OECD, TYPOLOGY ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES 14 (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/TypologyMLA2012.pdf. 
 128.  See generally, Mutual Legal Assistance, U.S.-Fr., Dec. 10, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 13,010. 
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agreement does not necessarily mean the two countries will have 
uninhibited cooperation during FCPA enforcements.129 But unlike France, 
the Working Group has not criticized Japan’s legal assistance to other 
nations.130 This could indicate that, while not proactively aiding U.S. 
prosecutors during FCPA prosecution, Japan at least operates in the full 
spirit of the MLAT and the cooperation obligations of the OECD 
Convention and does not hinder investigations in service of domestic 
interests.131 
III.  ANALYSIS: IDENTIFYING THE FACTORS DRIVING THE 
VARIED RESPONSE TO FOREIGN BRIBERY  
Germany, France, and Japan illustrate three different reactions to 
international anti-bribery commitments. Germany illustrates high-
compliance, high-enforcement, and a positive relationship with FCPA 
prosecutors. In France, on the other hand, there is limited anti-bribery 
enforcement hampered by political considerations and a conflicted 
relationship with the FCPA characterized by moments of cooperation 
overshadowed by challenging demands. And Japan gives insight into a 
country with little anti-bribery enforcement but an open attitude towards 
FCPA prosecution of its companies. In examining Germany, France, and 
Japan, it is possible to discern some factors that may explain why these 
countries have the compliance levels that they do. 
This Part begins with a point of comparison for complying with an 
international agreement: environmental protection agreements. Part III.A 
outlines how Germany, France, and Japan have complied with international 
agreements on the environment to show that these countries do not 
generally resist compliance with international agreements. While all three 
show strong records of compliance with environmental protection 
agreements, there is something about foreign bribery that is preventing the 
same result for compliance with the OECD Convention. With that in mind, 
this Part uses the next three sections to outline three likely factors that are 
affecting how these countries approach foreign bribery: economic, cultural, 
and political. Part III.B examines the economic influence of free-riding and 
 
 129.  See supra Part II.B.2 (detailing strains in France’s relationship with extraterritorial 
prosecution). 
 130.  See France: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, supra note 71, at 6 
(criticizing French policies regarding the prosecution and prevention of bribery and corruption); see 
also Japan: Follow-Up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, supra note 112, at 9 (saying only 
that Japan should seek out MLA earlier in proceedings, not that it fails to provide other nations with 
assistance). 
 131.  See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the Working Group’s suspicion that France fails to 
cooperate in international foreign bribery cases to protect its domestic interests). 
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internal pressure from domestic corporations. Part III.C looks at the 
“culture” of bribery in a country, or in other words, how internal views on 
corruption influence anti-bribery implementation. And Part III.D finishes 
with a discussion on how individual political motivations are driving some 
politicians away from bribery prosecution. 
A. A Point of Comparison: Environmental Protection Agreements 
To explain why these countries’ approaches to foreign bribery differ 
and whether these differences are attributable to broader resistance to 
international requirements, reviewing compliance with another 
international agreement is helpful. International agreements on protecting 
the environment are similar to those regulating foreign bribery. Like 
foreign bribery enforcement, environmental protections create a free-rider 
problem; there is an incentive to let other nations shoulder the costs of 
ensuring their companies abide by environmental regulations while letting 
one’s own companies benefit from non-enforcement. But companies can 
also benefit from environmental regulations that lead to more efficient use 
of resources.132 This is also similar to anti-bribery, as companies benefit 
from putting funds that would go to bribes back into the company. And like 
foreign bribery enforcement, there are international treaties meant to 
enforce the agreed upon standards.133 Thus, the general similarities of 
international environmental expectations and anti-bribery can provide 
insight into countries’ differing reactions to the two. 
Unlike their foreign corruption reviews, Germany, France, and Japan 
all receive high praise from the OECD for their active environmental 
commitments and international co-operation.134 The OECD hails Germany 
as “a leader in climate policy,”135 with a “wide-ranging and successful 
 
 132.  See, e.g., OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: FRANCE 17 (2005), 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/environment/oecd-environmental-
performance-reviews-france-2005_9789264009141-en (“Attention to environmental issues has 
reinforced economic development through the conservation of resources such as water and energy . . . 
.”). 
 133.  In fact, the UN Environment Programme has found up to “500 internationally recognised 
agreements in the past 50 years.” John Vidal, Many Treaties to Save the Earth, But Where’s the Will to 
Implement Them?, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2012/ 
jun/07/earth-treaties-environmental-agreements. 
 134.  Since this Note used the OECD reviews as a standard for assessing German, French, and 
Japanese performance in foreign corruption enforcement, the same organization was used in the 
environmental comparison for consistency. 
 135.  OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS HIGHLIGHTS: GERMANY 1 (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/50418430.pdf. 
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programme of international co-operation.”136 While the report mentions 
that there is room for improvement, it applauds German policy overall as 
“proactive” and “ambitious.”137 Similarly, the OECD notes that “France has 
been very active” in international environmental policy and “generally 
manages to reconcile its international trade with its environmental 
commitments.”138 While the OECD seems to have more concerns with 
policy in France than in Germany,139 the report is still positive overall, and 
adds that France is “engaged in bilateral, regional and global environmental 
co-operation.”140 Lastly, the OECD report for Japan highlights the 
country’s innovation and leadership.141 It further states, “Japan has played a 
proactive and constructive role in international environmental co-
operation.”142 And the government has a “good record of meeting 
international commitments in multilateral and other environmental 
agreements.”143 
These reviews reveal a contrast between the countries’ compliance 
with anti-bribery measures and their compliance with environmental 
measures. They also reveal discrepancies in France and Japan in 
implementing and enforcing these two international commitments. Both 
countries are far more proactive with their environmental policy than anti-
bribery policy. None of the OECD environmental reports covered a 
markedly longer time than the OECD anti-bribery reports.144 Therefore, 
while France and Japan have had more time to implement environmental 
 
 136.  OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: GERMANY 32 (2001), http:// 
www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/environment/oecd-environmental-performance-
reviews-germany-2001_9789264189447-en. 
 137.  ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS HIGHLIGHTS: GERMANY, supra note 135, at 1. 
 138.  ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: FRANCE, supra note 132, at 207. 
 139.  See id. at 17 (“Major concerns remain as regards pollution from agriculture and transport, the 
development of energy policy, improvement of environmental health and management of natural and 
technological risk.”). 
 140.  See id. (discussing positive changes in French environmental management). 
 141.  See OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS HIGHLIGHTS: JAPAN 1 (2010), http:// 
www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/46412900.pdf (“Japan is a world leader in a range of green 
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 142.  OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: JAPAN - ASSESSMENT AND 
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2015). 
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REVIEWS: JAPAN - ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 142, at 3. The German report 
covered data since 2000. ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS HIGHLIGHTS: GERMANY, supra 
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changes than anti-bribery changes, this does not explain the discrepancies. 
Rather, this information suggests that none of the examined countries are 
particularly adverse to abiding by international commitments that influence 
their domestic policy decisions. Rather, there is something specific about 
OECD commitments that drives these discrepancies in compliance. 
B.  Compliance Factors: Economic 
1. The Free Rider Problem 
A major concern for countries in implementing anti-bribery regimes is 
the effect it will have on their corporations. As the U.S. quickly discovered 
after implementing the FCPA, companies subject to anti-bribery regimes 
may lose business opportunities to companies that can make bribes without 
fear of repercussions.145 While a country may agree bribery is bad, it may 
not want to bear the cost of implementing an anti-bribery regime at an 
economic expense to its companies. At the same time, countries that do 
prosecute bribery cannot stop countries that do not from benefitting from 
their enforcement. In short, foreign bribery enforcement creates a free rider 
problem. 
Free riding occurs when an actor can forgo the costs of receiving a 
non-excludable good. Anti-corruption prosecution creates a non-excludable 
good because countries that do not spend the resources to implement or 
enforce anti-corruption regimes still benefit from enforcement by other 
countries.146 This benefit can be twofold. First, the non-enforcement 
country can save resources while other governments prosecute corporations 
for bribery that may affect the non-enforcement country. Bribery causes 
economic inefficiencies by shifting resources to the project with the best 
bribe rather than the best quality.147 It is an additional expense for the 
individual or company paying the bribe that could be going to a better use 
within the company. A country such as the U.S. may prosecute a company 
based in a non-enforcement country. This prosecution forces other 
companies in the non-enforcement country to consider removing their 
bribery practices or risk FCPA prosecution. Thus, the non-enforcement 
country benefits from more efficient, bribery-free companies without 
having to expend its own resources. 
Second, a non-enforcement country can give its corporations an 
“edge” abroad. Its corporations can use bribery to win contracts or get 
 
 145.  See supra Part I.A; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 146.  See HEATHER MARGUETTE & CARYN PEIFFER, CORRUPTION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 3 
(2015), http://publications.dlprog.org/CorruptionandCollectiveAction.pdf. 
 147.  Krever, supra note 3, at 85–86. 
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around barriers while corporations from anti-bribery enforcing countries 
cannot pay the bribes without fear of prosecution.148 Furthermore, a country 
can wait until other countries have implemented anti-bribery regimes. Then 
once a number of countries where competing businesses are located have 
adopted anti-bribery regimes, the non-enforcement country can start 
prosecuting bribery without fearing that its companies will lose contracts to 
competitors paying bribes. 
Free riding helps explain why countries may hold off on prosecuting 
foreign bribery. But it does not explain the variation in prosecution across 
countries if they all face free riding considerations. Additionally, 
environmental protections also present a free rider problem. But Germany, 
France, and Japan generally comply with environmental agreements. Thus, 
free riding is an important factor to keep in mind in analyzing the economic 
considerations a country faces in implementing an anti-bribery regime, but 
it is not the end of the analysis. 
2. Internal Pressure from Corporations 
A factor working against free riding, and providing better insight into 
variation across countries, is the internal pressure a government receives 
from its corporations to comply with international foreign bribery 
standards. In 2012, thirty German company executives wrote a letter to 
every political party in the German Bundestag that called for Germany to 
ratify the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.149 Germany had 
been hesitant due to language that would require “clear and meaningful 
punishments for elected officials found guilty of accepting bribes.”150 
However, the executives argued that “[t]he failure to ratify hurts the 
reputation of German businesses.”151 Germany ratified the UN Convention 
 
 148.  See id. at 100 (recognizing that there is an incentive to help business abroad by under-
enforcing anti-bribery laws). For example, U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office was ordered to halt a corruption 
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the political opposition has accused the Attorney General of simply giving in to political pressures to 
hide a questionable BAE arms deal. Id. 
 149.  Arnd Riekmann, German Push for Anti-Corruption Convention, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 9, 
2012), http://www.dw.de/german-push-for-anti-corruption-convention/a-16152697. The signatories of 
the letter included major German corporations: Deutsche Bank, Commerbank, Allianz, Siemens, 
Deutsche Telekom, Daimler, Linde, Bayer, Eon, Metro. Id. 
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in late 2014.152 Here, German corporations took on an initiative not seen in 
France or Japan to petition for more anti-bribery enforcement. 
Internal pressure from corporations for the government to adopt robust 
anti-bribery programs both increases the pressure to implement anti-bribery 
laws, and decreases a government’s concern that such laws would hurt its 
businesses abroad. As an expert in compliance and corruption from the 
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management noted, “The credibility of 
companies, individuals and entire countries in relation to agreed-upon rules 
- upon compliance - has an enormous economic value.”153 The spread of 
anti-bribery laws under the OECD Convention and increased FCPA 
prosecutions have forced companies to reevaluate their policies even if 
their home country is not an active enforcer. And with the increased focus 
on foreign bribery since the OECD Convention, companies want to 
advertise their compliance to attract possible buyers or partners that also 
need to ensure non-corrupt dealings. This advertising becomes easier if the 
company can point to strict compliance in their home country. 
But this internal pressure may exist in Germany rather than other 
countries because Germany has no corporate criminal liability.154 For 
German corporations, adopting stricter bribery laws gives the benefit of an 
image of compliance without having to suffer the danger of prosecution. 
The state may prosecute an individual, but someone representing the 
corporation as an entity need not worry about corporate liability. In 
contrast, we do not see the same internal pressure from corporations in 
France, where there is corporate criminal liability.155 Thus, corporate 
criminal liability for bribery can be a good predictor of when corporations 
may be in favor of adopting stricter bribery regulations. 
As corporations begin pressuring their government to adopt stronger 
anti-bribery regulations and withdraw from countries with high corruption 
 
 152.  Belatedly, Germany ratifies UN Anti-Corruption Convention, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 14, 
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infra Part III.C. 
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risks,156 countries with poorer compliance performance may begin to see 
the economic value in enforcing and strengthening their anti-bribery 
regimes. 
C.  Compliance Factors: Cultural 
The international community has recognized that bribery is a 
worldwide problem.157 But there are disagreements over how to identify 
and punish corruption.158 While all agree bribery is morally bad, there is 
disagreement about when an act becomes bribery and about how harshly it 
should be punished.159 What someone in the U.S. may see as clear 
preference-seeking activity may be seen as a routine, even expected 
practice of gift-giving in another culture. This disconnect becomes 
especially problematic during extraterritorial prosecution. When the U.S. 
prosecutes a foreign company under the FCPA, many countries and their 
citizens may see it as the extension of American values into their legal 
systems, rather than as an adherence to an international standard.160 And the 
worse a country is at prosecuting bribery on its own, the more an FCPA 
case there looks like legal imperialism rather than compliance with an 
international expectation of combating bribery. This increases the danger of 
citizens pressuring their government to move away from cooperation in 
bribery cases and may negatively impact how the country approaches 
foreign bribery on its own as well. 
Thus, understanding how the citizens of a country view bribery can 
help explain some of the variations in prosecution.  A country’s bribery 
“culture” can be a product of a number of factors, including economic 
trends, history, and societal values. By looking at how the citizens in 
Germany, France, and Japan view corruption, and what may shape those 
views, we can see how a country’s bribery culture can affect prosecution 
rates. 
A basic indicator of how a citizenry views bribery is to see if they 
consider it a crime at all. In Germany, ninety percent of employees believe 
that if they commit bribery crimes, a public prosecutor will investigate 
 
 156.  Annex 5 (Germany) to the EU Anti-Corruption Report, supra note 59, at 8–9. 
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 160.  See Kravets, supra note 63, at 32. 
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them.161 In contrast, half of the companies in Japan feel that their         
employees do not know bribery is a criminal offense.162 A crime is much 
harder to deter if the citizenry is not even aware their actions are illegal. It 
also poses reporting challenges if no one in the company or with access to 
evidence of bribery thinks to report it to the authorities.  Thus, this basic 
perception on the legality of bribery can have dramatic effects on 
enforcement. 
One explanation for the difference between German and Japanese 
awareness of the illegality of bribes may be contrasting gift-giving 
traditions. The boundary between gift-giving and bribery in Japan is 
complicated by the general gift-giving culture in Asian countries.163 Unlike 
most Western traditions, gifts are exchanged as a way to build 
relationships, which could look like bribery in a business setting.164 But if 
the public sees gifts where other countries see bribes, Japan may lack the 
domestic incentive to expand resources on a problem with no public 
pressure to fix it. 
To be fair, Japan has sought to improve its lack of OECD Convention 
compliance.165 But “[o]ne reason for Japan’s laid-back approach might be 
that U.S. authorities who prosecute Japanese corporations are already so 
effective.”166 This theory could explain why Japan has low compliance but 
is apparently willing to cooperate through MLATs during FCPA 
enforcements; the lack of public awareness in Japan makes it a free rider 
country. Without internal pressure to enforce anti-bribery laws, Japan is 
letting other countries bear the cost of enforcement. 
The strength of a country’s economy also affects perceptions of 
corruption. There is a “correlation between tolerance for corruption and the 
pain companies in various countries felt during the global financial 
crisis.”167 Germany exemplifies this theory. It did better than other 
European Union countries during the recession.168 And while in 2009 “one 
in four German business people said bribes were a legitimate way of 
expanding business,” today only three percent of managers and twelve 
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percent of other employees hold that view.169 In comparison, those same 
figures across Europe are eighteen percent and seventeen percent, 
respectively.170 As companies become less concerned with financial 
turmoil, they can afford to look to other areas such as bribery compliance 
standards.171 And as they focus on bribery compliance, we see the incentive 
structure that leads to corporate pressure on the government to comply with 
international anti-bribery standards. 
Lastly, the relative value a country puts on its privacy laws can affect 
anti-bribery enforcement. For example, France has put a premium on its 
data privacy at the expense of anti-corruption investigations and corporate 
compliance.172 So long as France continues to put the protection of personal 
data over prosecuting bribery, improving conviction rates will be difficult, 
and countries such as the U.S. pursuing foreign bribery cases in France will 
face barriers to their investigations. 
There could be more factors not seen in this study that play a role in a 
country’s bribery culture. But the analysis of Germany, France, and Japan 
points to the conclusion that how a citizenry views bribery can affect how 
its government will punish it. 
D.  Compliance Factors: Political 
France exemplifies the situation where political considerations hamper 
legitimate anti-bribery efforts. Sixty-two percent of French respondents 
think “the only way to succeed in business is to have political 
connections.”173 And approximately fifty percent think corruption is 
widespread in public procurement.174 As evidenced in the Working Group’s 
concerns, French prosecutors lack independence during anti-bribery 
investigations.175 Overall, there is an intertwining of business and politics 
that, when combined with low anti-bribery enforcement, suggests that 
bribery convictions may implicate politicians in a way they are trying to 
avoid. 
France is not alone. The German Bundestag’s resistance to signing the 
UN Convention due to its political official liability suggests the existence 
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of similar concerns in Germany.176 With the country’s corporations pushing 
to ratify, the remaining rationale was that politicians were protecting 
themselves from potential liability for accepting bribes.177 However, 
Germany does not have the political oversight of bribery prosecution seen 
in France.178 Thus, while German politicians may have personal concerns 
about anti-bribery liability, prosecutors could continue unhindered in their 
cases against individuals and businesses. In France, the amount of political 
oversight, coupled with the perception that businesses must avail 
themselves of politicians to succeed, indicates both an incentive and a 
means for French politicians to limit bribery investigations. Overall, 
politicians’ interests may impede OECD Convention compliance and 
prevent future anti-bribery legislation focused on the political world rather 
than the business world. And a regime that allows for political control over 
the bribery prosecution process is more likely to see limited enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
The international community has agreed for nearly two decades that 
countries must combat foreign bribery. But dramatic variation in foreign 
bribery prosecution continues even among countries that have signed the 
OECD Convention. An analysis of how Germany, France, and Japan 
approach foreign bribery has revealed some of the factors that explain this 
variation. From an economic standpoint, internal pressure from 
corporations to adopt anti-bribery measures can push a government to 
change its approach. But this, in turn, is affected by whether the 
government has corporate criminal liability. Additionally, a country’s 
bribery culture can influence its stance on foreign bribery. Finally, 
individual political motivations can act as a barrier to foreign bribery 
prosecution progress. 
Further research is needed across more countries to understand how 
these factors interact and what other factors may be at work. The analysis 
of international environmental agreements has shown that a general disdain 
for bending to international pressure cannot explain non-compliance here. 
Additional comparisons to other international agreements may reveal when 
countries are quick to comply with international standards and when they 
hold out on full compliance. Moreover, empirical research is necessary to 
establish how governments weigh the factors in this study or other factors 
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in making foreign bribery regime decisions. This could take the form of 
analyzing legislative notes or surveying foreign bribery prosecutors. 
Overall, the area of international foreign bribery prosecution offers an 
interesting problem given the variation in enforcement. Understanding this 
variation through further research could provide insight into compliance 
with international agreements in general and help predict the future of 
foreign bribery prosecution. 
 
